1 /*
2  * EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines
3  * Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
4  *
5  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6  * See README for more details.
7  */
8 
9 #include "includes.h"
10 #include "common.h"
11 #include "utils/const_time.h"
12 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
13 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
14 #include "eap_defs.h"
15 #include "eap_pwd_common.h"
16 
17 #define MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN 66
18 
19 
20 /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
eap_pwd_h_init(void)21 struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
22 {
23 	u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
24 	os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
25 	return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero,
26 				SHA256_MAC_LEN);
27 }
28 
29 
eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash * hash,const u8 * data,size_t len)30 void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len)
31 {
32 	crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len);
33 }
34 
35 
eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash * hash,u8 * digest)36 void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest)
37 {
38 	size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
39 	crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len);
40 }
41 
42 
43 /* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 * key,size_t keylen,const u8 * label,size_t labellen,u8 * result,size_t resultbitlen)44 static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
45 		       size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen)
46 {
47 	struct crypto_hash *hash;
48 	u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
49 	u16 i, ctr, L;
50 	size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen;
51 
52 	resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8;
53 	ctr = 0;
54 	L = htons(resultbitlen);
55 	while (len < resultbytelen) {
56 		ctr++;
57 		i = htons(ctr);
58 		hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
59 					key, keylen);
60 		if (hash == NULL)
61 			return -1;
62 		if (ctr > 1)
63 			crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
64 		crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
65 		crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen);
66 		crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
67 		mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
68 		if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0)
69 			return -1;
70 		if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen)
71 			os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
72 		else
73 			os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
74 		len += mdlen;
75 	}
76 
77 	/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
78 	if (resultbitlen % 8) {
79 		u8 mask = 0xff;
80 		mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
81 		result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
82 	}
83 
84 	return 0;
85 }
86 
87 
eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)88 static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
89 {
90 	/* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
91 	 * for the similar design in SAE. */
92 	return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
93 		num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
94 }
95 
96 
get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)97 EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
98 {
99 	EAP_PWD_group *grp;
100 
101 	if (!eap_pwd_suitable_group(num)) {
102 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsuitable group %u", num);
103 		return NULL;
104 	}
105 	grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
106 	if (!grp)
107 		return NULL;
108 	grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
109 	if (!grp->group) {
110 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC group");
111 		os_free(grp);
112 		return NULL;
113 	}
114 
115 	grp->group_num = num;
116 	wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: provisioned group %d", num);
117 
118 	return grp;
119 }
120 
121 
buf_shift_right(u8 * buf,size_t len,size_t bits)122 static void buf_shift_right(u8 *buf, size_t len, size_t bits)
123 {
124 	size_t i;
125 	for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
126 		buf[i] = (buf[i - 1] << (8 - bits)) | (buf[i] >> bits);
127 	buf[0] >>= bits;
128 }
129 
130 
131 /*
132  * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
133  * on the password and identities.
134  */
compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group * grp,u16 num,const u8 * password,size_t password_len,const u8 * id_server,size_t id_server_len,const u8 * id_peer,size_t id_peer_len,const u8 * token)135 int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
136 			     const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
137 			     const u8 *id_server, size_t id_server_len,
138 			     const u8 *id_peer, size_t id_peer_len,
139 			     const u8 *token)
140 {
141 	struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *one = NULL;
142 	struct crypto_bignum *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
143 	u8 qr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
144 	u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
145 	u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
146 	u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
147 	u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
148 	struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
149 	struct crypto_hash *hash;
150 	unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
151 	int ret = 0, check, res;
152 	u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
153 		       * mask */
154 	size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
155 	struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
156 	const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
157 	u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
158 
159 	if (grp->pwe)
160 		return -1;
161 
162 	os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
163 
164 	prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
165 	primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
166 	primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
167 	if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
168 				 primebytelen) < 0)
169 		return -1;
170 	grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
171 	tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
172 	pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
173 	one = crypto_bignum_init_set((const u8 *) "\x01", 1);
174 	if (!grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
175 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
176 		goto fail;
177 	}
178 
179 	if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
180 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
181 			   "buffer");
182 		goto fail;
183 	}
184 	if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, one, pm1) < 0)
185 		goto fail;
186 
187 	/* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */
188 	while (!qr || !qnr) {
189 		if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, prime) < 0)
190 			goto fail;
191 		res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp1, prime);
192 		if (!qr && res == 1) {
193 			qr = tmp1;
194 			tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
195 		} else if (!qnr && res == -1) {
196 			qnr = tmp1;
197 			tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
198 		}
199 		if (!tmp1)
200 			goto fail;
201 	}
202 	if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin),
203 				 primebytelen) < 0 ||
204 	    crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin),
205 				 primebytelen) < 0)
206 		goto fail;
207 
208 	os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
209 	ctr = 0;
210 
211 	/*
212 	 * Run through the hunting-and-pecking loop 40 times to mask the time
213 	 * necessary to find PWE. The odds of PWE not being found in 40 loops is
214 	 * roughly 1 in 1 trillion.
215 	 */
216 	while (ctr < 40) {
217 		ctr++;
218 
219 		/*
220 		 * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
221 		 *    pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
222 		 *		   counter)
223 		 */
224 		hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
225 		if (hash == NULL)
226 			goto fail;
227 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32));
228 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len);
229 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
230 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
231 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
232 		eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
233 
234 		is_odd = const_time_select_u8(
235 			found, is_odd, pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
236 		if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
237 				(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
238 				os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
239 				prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
240 			goto fail;
241 		if (primebitlen % 8)
242 			buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
243 					8 - primebitlen % 8);
244 		if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
245 			continue;
246 
247 		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
248 		x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
249 		if (!x_candidate) {
250 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
251 				   "EAP-pwd: unable to create x_candidate");
252 			goto fail;
253 		}
254 
255 		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
256 				prfbuf, primebytelen);
257 		const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
258 				      x_bin);
259 
260 		/*
261 		 * compute y^2 using the equation of the curve
262 		 *
263 		 *      y^2 = x^3 + ax + b
264 		 */
265 		crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
266 		tmp2 = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate);
267 		if (!tmp2)
268 			goto fail;
269 
270 		/*
271 		 * mask tmp2 so doing legendre won't leak timing info
272 		 *
273 		 * tmp1 is a random number between 1 and p-1
274 		 */
275 		if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, pm1) < 0 ||
276 		    crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, tmp1, prime, tmp2) < 0 ||
277 		    crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, tmp1, prime, tmp2) < 0)
278 			goto fail;
279 
280 		/*
281 		 * Now tmp2 (y^2) is masked, all values between 1 and p-1
282 		 * are equally probable. Multiplying by r^2 does not change
283 		 * whether or not tmp2 is a quadratic residue, just masks it.
284 		 *
285 		 * Flip a coin, multiply by the random quadratic residue or the
286 		 * random quadratic nonresidue and record heads or tails.
287 		 */
288 		mask = const_time_eq_u8(crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1), 1);
289 		check = const_time_select_s8(mask, 1, -1);
290 		const_time_select_bin(mask, qr_bin, qnr_bin, primebytelen,
291 				      qr_or_qnr_bin);
292 		crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
293 		qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, primebytelen);
294 		if (!qr_or_qnr ||
295 		    crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr_or_qnr, prime, tmp2) < 0)
296 			goto fail;
297 
298 		/*
299 		 * Now it's safe to do legendre, if check is 1 then it's
300 		 * a straightforward test (multiplying by qr does not
301 		 * change result), if check is -1 then it's the opposite test
302 		 * (multiplying a qr by qnr would make a qnr).
303 		 */
304 		res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime);
305 		if (res == -2)
306 			goto fail;
307 		mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
308 		found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
309 		found |= mask;
310 	}
311 	if (found == 0) {
312 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
313 			   "EAP-pwd: unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy",
314 			   num);
315 		goto fail;
316 	}
317 
318 	/*
319 	 * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set it here.
320 	 */
321 	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
322 	x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);
323 	if (!x_candidate ||
324 	    crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate,
325 					  is_odd) != 0) {
326 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
327 		goto fail;
328 	}
329 
330 	/*
331 	 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be on the
332 	 * curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code says this is
333 	 * required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
334 	 */
335 	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
336 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
337 		goto fail;
338 	}
339 
340 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
341 
342 	if (0) {
343  fail:
344 		crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
345 		grp->pwe = NULL;
346 		ret = 1;
347 	}
348 	/* cleanliness and order.... */
349 	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
350 	crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
351 	crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
352 	crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
353 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
354 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
355 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
356 	crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);
357 	bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen);
358 	os_memset(qr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_bin));
359 	os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));
360 	os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));
361 	os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));
362 
363 	return ret;
364 }
365 
366 
compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group * grp,const struct crypto_bignum * k,const struct crypto_bignum * peer_scalar,const struct crypto_bignum * server_scalar,const u8 * confirm_peer,const u8 * confirm_server,const u32 * ciphersuite,u8 * msk,u8 * emsk,u8 * session_id)367 int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, const struct crypto_bignum *k,
368 		 const struct crypto_bignum *peer_scalar,
369 		 const struct crypto_bignum *server_scalar,
370 		 const u8 *confirm_peer, const u8 *confirm_server,
371 		 const u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk, u8 *session_id)
372 {
373 	struct crypto_hash *hash;
374 	u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft;
375 	u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
376 	size_t prime_len, order_len;
377 
378 	prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
379 	order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(grp->group);
380 
381 	cruft = os_malloc(prime_len);
382 	if (!cruft)
383 		return -1;
384 
385 	/*
386 	 * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
387 	 *	scal_s)
388 	 */
389 	session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
390 	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
391 	if (hash == NULL) {
392 		os_free(cruft);
393 		return -1;
394 	}
395 	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (const u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
396 	crypto_bignum_to_bin(peer_scalar, cruft, order_len, order_len);
397 	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, order_len);
398 	crypto_bignum_to_bin(server_scalar, cruft, order_len, order_len);
399 	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, order_len);
400 	eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]);
401 
402 	/* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */
403 	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
404 	if (hash == NULL) {
405 		os_free(cruft);
406 		return -1;
407 	}
408 	crypto_bignum_to_bin(k, cruft, prime_len, prime_len);
409 	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, prime_len);
410 	os_free(cruft);
411 	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
412 	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
413 	eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk);
414 
415 	/* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
416 	if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
417 			session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1,
418 			msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) {
419 		return -1;
420 	}
421 
422 	os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
423 	os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
424 
425 	return 1;
426 }
427 
428 
eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum * prime,const u8 * buf,size_t len)429 static int eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum *prime,
430 				    const u8 *buf, size_t len)
431 {
432 	struct crypto_bignum *val;
433 	int ok = 1;
434 
435 	val = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, len);
436 	if (!val || crypto_bignum_is_zero(val) ||
437 	    crypto_bignum_cmp(val, prime) >= 0)
438 		ok = 0;
439 	crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 0);
440 	return ok;
441 }
442 
443 
eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group * group,const u8 * buf)444 struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
445 					     const u8 *buf)
446 {
447 	struct crypto_ec_point *element;
448 	const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
449 	size_t prime_len;
450 
451 	prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(group->group);
452 	prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(group->group);
453 
454 	/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: 0 < x,y < p */
455 	if (!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf, prime_len) ||
456 	    !eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf + prime_len, prime_len)) {
457 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid coordinate in element");
458 		return NULL;
459 	}
460 
461 	element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(group->group, buf);
462 	if (!element) {
463 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: EC point from element failed");
464 		return NULL;
465 	}
466 
467 	/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: on curve and not the point at infinity */
468 	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(group->group, element) ||
469 	    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, element)) {
470 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid element");
471 		goto fail;
472 	}
473 
474 out:
475 	return element;
476 fail:
477 	crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
478 	element = NULL;
479 	goto out;
480 }
481 
482 
eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group * group,const u8 * buf)483 struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf)
484 {
485 	struct crypto_bignum *scalar;
486 	const struct crypto_bignum *order;
487 	size_t order_len;
488 
489 	order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
490 	order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(group->group);
491 
492 	/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2: 1 < scalar < r */
493 	scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, order_len);
494 	if (!scalar || crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) ||
495 	    crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar) ||
496 	    crypto_bignum_cmp(scalar, order) >= 0) {
497 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: received scalar is invalid");
498 		crypto_bignum_deinit(scalar, 0);
499 		scalar = NULL;
500 	}
501 
502 	return scalar;
503 }
504 
505 
eap_pwd_get_rand_mask(EAP_PWD_group * group,struct crypto_bignum * _rand,struct crypto_bignum * _mask,struct crypto_bignum * scalar)506 int eap_pwd_get_rand_mask(EAP_PWD_group *group, struct crypto_bignum *_rand,
507 			  struct crypto_bignum *_mask,
508 			  struct crypto_bignum *scalar)
509 {
510 	const struct crypto_bignum *order;
511 	int count;
512 
513 	order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
514 
515 	/* Select two random values rand,mask such that 1 < rand,mask < r and
516 	 * rand + mask mod r > 1. */
517 	for (count = 0; count < 100; count++) {
518 		if (crypto_bignum_rand(_rand, order) == 0 &&
519 		    !crypto_bignum_is_zero(_rand) &&
520 		    crypto_bignum_rand(_mask, order) == 0 &&
521 		    !crypto_bignum_is_zero(_mask) &&
522 		    crypto_bignum_add(_rand, _mask, scalar) == 0 &&
523 		    crypto_bignum_mod(scalar, order, scalar) == 0 &&
524 		    !crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) &&
525 		    !crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar))
526 			return 0;
527 	}
528 
529 	wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get randomness");
530 	return -1;
531 }
532