1###
2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
3###
4
5typeattribute priv_app coredomain;
6app_domain(priv_app)
7
8# Access the network.
9net_domain(priv_app)
10# Access bluetooth.
11bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
12
13# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
14# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
15create_pty(priv_app)
16
17# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
18allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
19
20# Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out
21# to their sandbox directory and then dlopen().
22allow priv_app app_data_file:file execute;
23
24allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
25allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
26allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
27allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
28allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
29allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
30allow priv_app mediacasserver_service:service_manager find;
31allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
32allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
33allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
34allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
35allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
36allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
37allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
38allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
39allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
40allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
41
42# Write to /cache.
43allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
44allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
45# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
46allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
47
48# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
49allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
50allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
51
52# Access to /data/media.
53allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
54allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
55
56# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
57# running "adb install foo.apk".
58allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
59allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
60
61# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
62allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
63allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
64
65# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
66allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
67
68# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
69# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
70# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
71userdebug_or_eng(`
72  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
73  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
74')
75
76# For AppFuse.
77allow priv_app vold:fd use;
78allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
79
80# /sys and /proc access
81r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type)
82r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
83r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
84
85# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
86allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
87
88# access the mac address
89allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
90
91# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
92binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
93allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
94
95# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
96binder_call(priv_app, storaged)
97allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
98
99# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
100allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
101
102# Access to /data/preloads
103allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
104allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
105allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
106allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
107
108# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
109# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
110allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
111
112# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
113# MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
114allow priv_app functionfs:dir search;
115allow priv_app functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
116
117# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
118# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
119# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
120allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
121
122# Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs
123allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
124
125read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
126
127###
128### neverallow rules
129###
130
131# Receive or send uevent messages.
132neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
133
134# Receive or send generic netlink messages
135neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
136
137# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
138# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
139neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
140
141# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
142# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
143# services.
144neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
145
146# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
147# or set properties. b/10243159
148neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
149neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
150neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
151
152# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
153# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
154# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
155# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
156# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
157# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
158# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
159# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
160neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
161
162# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
163# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
164# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
165# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
166# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
167# capability.
168neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
169