1###
2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
3###
4
5typeattribute priv_app coredomain;
6app_domain(priv_app)
7
8# Access the network.
9net_domain(priv_app)
10# Access bluetooth.
11bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
12
13# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
14# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
15create_pty(priv_app)
16
17# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
18allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
19
20# Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out
21# to their sandbox directory and then dlopen().
22allow priv_app app_data_file:file execute;
23
24allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
25allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
26allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
27allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
28allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
29allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
30allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
31allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
32allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
33allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
34allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
35allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
36allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
37allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
38allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
39allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
40
41# Write to /cache.
42allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
43allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
44# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
45allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
46
47# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
48allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
49allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
50
51# Access to /data/media.
52allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
53allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
54
55# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
56# running "adb install foo.apk".
57allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
58allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
59
60# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
61allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
62allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
63
64# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
65allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
66
67# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
68# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
69# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
70userdebug_or_eng(`
71  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
72  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
73')
74
75# For AppFuse.
76allow priv_app vold:fd use;
77allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
78
79# /sys and /proc access
80r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type)
81r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
82r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
83
84# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
85allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
86
87# access the mac address
88allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
89
90# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
91binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
92allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
93
94# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
95binder_call(priv_app, storaged)
96allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
97
98# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
99allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
100
101# Access to /data/preloads
102allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
103allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
104allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
105allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
106
107# Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs
108allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
109
110# Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
111allow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
112
113read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
114
115# suppress denials when safetynet scans /system
116dontaudit priv_app exec_type:file getattr;
117
118###
119### neverallow rules
120###
121
122# Receive or send uevent messages.
123neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
124
125# Receive or send generic netlink messages
126neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
127
128# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
129# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
130neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
131
132# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
133# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
134# services.
135neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
136
137# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
138# or set properties. b/10243159
139neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
140neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
141neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
142
143# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
144# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
145# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
146# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
147# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
148# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
149# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
150# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
151neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
152
153# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
154# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
155# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
156# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
157# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
158# capability.
159neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
160