1### 2### Untrusted_app_all. 3### 4### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except 5### ephemeral_app for instant apps. 6### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and 7### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID 8### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data 9### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default 10### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000) 11### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo 12### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this 13### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps 14### that are not signed by the platform key. To move 15### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to 16### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values 17### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and 18### seapp_contexts. 19### 20### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also 21### added to ephemeral_app.te. 22 23# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out 24# to their sandbox directory and then execute. 25allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; 26allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; 27auditallow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file execute; 28 29# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables 30# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422) 31allow untrusted_app_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans; 32 33# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality. 34allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms; 35 36# Allow handling of less common filesystem objects 37allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:{ lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms; 38 39# Allow loading and deleting executable shared libraries 40# within an application home directory. Such shared libraries would be 41# created by things like renderscript or via other mechanisms. 42allow untrusted_app_all app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink }; 43 44# ASEC 45allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms; 46allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms; 47# Execute libs in asec containers. 48allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute }; 49 50# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when 51# running "adb install foo.apk". 52# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files. 53# Figure out a way to remove these rules. 54allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; 55allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 56 57# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps 58# for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail 59allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read }; 60 61# untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend 62# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor 63neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *; 64neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open }; 65 66# Allow to read staged apks. 67allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr}; 68 69# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder. 70# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for 71# cropping or taking user photos. 72allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr }; 73 74# 75# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app. 76# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app. 77# 78 79# Access to /data/media. 80allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 81allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; 82 83# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon 84# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider 85allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; 86 87# allow cts to query all services 88allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list; 89 90allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find; 91allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find; 92allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find; 93allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find; 94allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; 95allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find; 96allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find; 97allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; 98allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find; 99allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find; 100allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find; 101allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find; 102allow untrusted_app_all gpu_service:service_manager find; 103 104# Allow untrusted apps to interact with gpuservice 105binder_call(untrusted_app_all, gpuservice) 106 107# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored 108# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all 109# data stored in that directory to process them one by one. 110userdebug_or_eng(` 111 allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; 112 allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 113') 114 115# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process. 116allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace; 117 118# Android Studio Instant Run has the application connect to a 119# runas_app socket listening in the abstract namespace. 120# https://developer.android.com/studio/run/ 121# b/123297648 122allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:unix_stream_socket connectto; 123 124# Untrusted apps need to be able to send a SIGCHLD to runas_app 125# when running under a debugger (b/123612207) 126allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:process sigchld; 127 128# Cts: HwRngTest 129allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search; 130allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms; 131 132# Allow apps to view preloaded media content 133allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; 134allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; 135allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search; 136 137# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can 138# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves. 139# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed 140# apps. 141allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search }; 142allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; 143allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read }; 144 145# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires 146# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. 147allow untrusted_app_all traced:fd use; 148allow untrusted_app_all traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map }; 149unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_all, traced_producer, traced) 150 151# Allow heap profiling if the app opts in by being marked 152# profileable/debuggable. 153can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all) 154 155# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not 156# modify them other than to connect 157allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket { 158 connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt }; 159 160# Allow the renderscript compiler to be run. 161domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app_all, rs_exec, rs) 162 163# This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions. 164dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read; 165 166# These have been disallowed since Android O. 167# For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial. 168dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read; 169dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read; 170dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read; 171 172# Allow the allocation and use of ptys 173# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm 174create_pty(untrusted_app_all) 175 176# Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign 177# that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before 178# the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Suppress this 179# denial to prevent third party apps from spamming the logs. 180dontaudit untrusted_app_all system_data_file:dir write; 181 182# Allow access to kcov via its ioctl interface for coverage 183# guided kernel fuzzing. 184userdebug_or_eng(` 185 allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms; 186 allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE }; 187') 188 189# Allow access to ashmemd to request /dev/ashmem fds. 190binder_call(untrusted_app_all, ashmemd) 191allow untrusted_app_all ashmem_device:chr_file { getattr read ioctl lock map append write }; 192