1###
2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
3###
4type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated;
5app_domain(priv_app)
6# Access the network.
7net_domain(priv_app)
8# Access bluetooth.
9bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
10
11# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
12allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
13
14# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
15# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
16allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
17
18# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
19allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
20
21# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
22# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
23create_pty(priv_app)
24
25allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
26allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
27allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
28allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
29allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
30allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
31allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
32allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
33allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
34allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
35allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
36allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
37allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
38allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
39
40# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
41# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
42allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
43
44# Write to /cache.
45allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
46allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
47
48# Access to /data/media.
49allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
50allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
51
52# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
53# running "adb install foo.apk".
54allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
55allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
56
57# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
58allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
59allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
60
61# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
62allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
63
64# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
65# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
66# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
67userdebug_or_eng(`
68  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
69  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
70')
71
72# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
73allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
74
75# For AppFuse.
76allow priv_app vold:fd use;
77allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
78allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
79allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms;
80
81# /sys access
82allow priv_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
83allow priv_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
84
85# access the mac address
86allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
87
88# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
89binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
90allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
91
92# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
93allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
94
95# Access to /data/preloads
96allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
97allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
98
99###
100### neverallow rules
101###
102
103# Receive or send uevent messages.
104neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
105
106# Receive or send generic netlink messages
107neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
108
109# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
110# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
111neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
112
113# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
114# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
115# services.
116neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
117
118# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
119# or set properties. b/10243159
120neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
121neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
122neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
123
124# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
125# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
126# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
127# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
128# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
129# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
130# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
131# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
132neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
133
134# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
135# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
136# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
137# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
138# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
139# capability.
140neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
141